China

For a comprehensive review of these efforts, see: Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, 2007, chapters 4, 8, and 13.

For further discussion on the sensitivity of these figures to alternative definitions, see Table A2 in the appendix.

These were discussed by then-SASAC head Li Rongrong in 2006. See “SASCAC: State-owned economy should maintain absolute control over seven industries,” Xinhua, December 18, 2006, https://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm.

China Mobile Limited, Developing New Quality Productive Forces: Annual Report 2023.

Taiwan, which also saw its share of US imports grow very fast, is excluded for lack of data.

The baseline projections in the IMF’s April 2025 World Economic reflect the Fund’s “reference forecast” based on policies announced as of April 4. This does not reflect the 90-day pause of US reciprocal tariffs announced on April 9, nor does it include the full set of US-China tariff escalation and retaliation that followed the April 2 reciprocal tariff announcement.

Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020, Universidad Nacional Autónomica de México, Facultad de Economía, 2021.

Ibid.

Margaret Pearson et al., “Party-State Capitalism in China,” Current History 120: 827 (September 2021): 207–213 https://online.ucpress.edu/currenthistory/article/120/827/207/118341/Party-State-Capitalism-in-China.

Agatha Kratz, “Exporting ‘Harmony and Rejuvenation’: Explaining the Surprising Track Record of China’s Global High-speed Rail Expansion,” PhD diss. Lau China Institute King’s College London, 2018.

Based on China Customs trade data

NBS data

Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020, Universidad Nacional Autónomica de México, Facultad de Economía, 2021. Cited in Peter Bofinger et al,. “Credit as an Instrument for Growth: A Monetary Explanation of the Chinese Growth Story,” Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, July 2023, https://www.boeckler.de/data/downloads/IMK/FMM%20Konferenz%202023/v_2023_10_20_bofinger.pdf.

World bank data

According to China Association of Automobile Manufacturers

Summarized US Chamber of Commerce, “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections,” 2017, https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf.  and Jost Wübbeke et al., “Made in China 2025 The making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial countries” Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2016, https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Made%20in%20China%202025.pdf.

For details see PBOC and other ministries, “Several Opinions on Finance to Support Industry Stable Growth, Restructuring, and Improving Profit [关于金融支持工业稳增长调结构增效益的若干意见],” February 16, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-02/16/content_5041671.htm, cited in US Chamber of Commerce, “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections,” 2017, https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf

Lee Branstetter and Li Guangwei, “Does Made in China 2025 Work for China? Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms,” National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2022, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30676/w30676.pdf.

In 2023-2024, faced with a decline in foreign investment in China, some local governments issued a series of policies assuring that foreign-invested firms would be able to enjoy incentives such as the “first-purchase” measures, which grants procurement advantages to domestic products. In December 2024, the Ministry of Finance issued “Circular on Matters Concerning Standards for Domestic Products in Government Procurement and Implementation Policies (Draft for Comment),” a draft policy granting advantages to products made in China, regardless of the firms’ ownership. However, over the past years, local governments have tended to include “Buy China” clauses in their procurement guidelines, creating uncertainty for foreign companies. Official guidance has often targeted innovative products made by domestic companies, including the “Administrative Measures for the First Government Purchase and Ordering of Independent Innovation Products” (2007), the “Administrative Measures for Government Procurement of Imported Products” (2007), and the “Opinions on Promoting the Demonstration and Application of the First Major Technological Equipment” (2018).

EU Chamber of Commerce in China, Made in China 2025: The Cost of Technological Leadership, 16 April 2025.

Interviews conducted for this study

Rhodium analysis of SEMI Fab Watch data

HS codes, or Harmonized System codes, are an internationally standardized system for classifying traded goods. They consist of six-digit codes that identify specific product categories, allowing for detailed analysis of trade flows

Industrial enterprises are defined as all state-owned industrial enterprises and the non-state-owned industrial enterprises with revenue from principal business over 5 million yuan from 1998 to 2006; all industrial enterprises with revenue from principal business over 5 million yuan from 2007 to 2010; and all industrial enterprises with revenue from principal business above 20 million yuan since 2011. It only includes firms in the mining and manufacturing sectors.

See the conclusions of the EU Commission investigation under the International Procurement Instrument concerning measures and practices of the People’s Republic of China in the public procurement market for medical devices, which details many of these policies in the medical device area.

China’s Ministry of Commerce, “Standard Conditions of Automobile Traction Battery Industry,” March 24, 2015. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/g/201505/20150500987728.shtml.

Cited in National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, “National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology Urges Swift Action to Protect U.S. National Security,” April 8, 2025, https://www.biotech.senate.gov/press-releases/nsceb-publishes-final-report/.

Riitta Katila, “Using Patent Data to Measure Innovation Performance,” International Journal of Business Performance Measurement, 2000, https://web.stanford.edu/~rkatila/new/pdf/KatilaUsingpatentdata.pdf.

KUKA has the distinction of being a German firm that is now owned by the Chinese firm Midea. Midea acquired the German robotmaker through its subsidiary Mecca International (BVI) Ltd. in 2016. Prior to the acquisition, Midea was already involved in the industrial automation industry more broadly as well as robot manufacturing under its own brand.

OECD data.

Xueshulunwenwang, “Research on the Transformation Mechanism of Scientific and Technological Achievements of State-Owned Scientific Research Institutions under the Intellectual Property System Professional Graduate  [知识产权体系下国有科研机构科 技成果转化机制研究],” August 2, 2023, https://www.xueshulunwenwang.com/guanlilei/xingzhengguanli/3290.html.

Mollema, Rijk Eric. “The Nazi Economy (1933–1939): Unemployment, Autarky and the Working-Class.” the ascendant historian 4.1 (2017): 64-74.

Deng Yangyang, Li Xiaohua, and Ye Aishan, “Research on Total Factor Productivity in China’s Economic Growth Since the Reform and opening-up,” EAI, June 07, 2024, https://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.29-3-2024.2347395.

Chan, Francis et al., “Made in China 2025 Industrial Master Plan Advances at Home, Faces Obstacles Abroad,” Bloomberg Intelligence, October 30, 2024.

Yao Hailin, Zhu Meiling and Tan Shuyao, “Current status, bottlenecks and countermeasures of domestic substitution of key strategic materials in China [中国关键战略材料国产化替代现状、制约瓶颈及对策],” Central South University School of Business, 2023, https://dazhi-1255704882.cos.ap-shanghai.myqcloud.com/uploads/20240407/6b58c565ee352de27cc7c3dda32e60c1.pdf.

These countries include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. We focus here on manufacturing FDI, most directly affected by (and hence a better proxy for measuring the impact of) de-risking policies and firms’ diversification momentum.

ICT and electronics include semiconductors, IT equipment, and other electronics like PCBs.

Note that while the EU has only used safeguards once (on steel) and CVD cases remain relatively rare, AD investigations are widely used in Brussels. This preference is driven by two factors. First, AD investigations require a lower burden of proof, and a less complex investigative process compared to CVD cases. Second, in cases involving China, the EU can apply its “significant market distortions” (SMD) methodology, which allows the calculation of dumped prices using alternative benchmarks rather than relying on China’s domestic prices. This often results in significantly higher duties than those imposed through CVDs.

Note that while the WTO Appellate Body remains effectively inoperable, the EU could still pursue these cases using the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA)—a temporary alternative system created by the EU and other WTO members to maintain dispute resolution in the absence of a functioning appellate body.

CFIUS jurisdiction broadly excludes greenfield investment, except in cases where located in proximity to specified US government sites, military installations, or critical infrastructure.

“Intentionally materially breaches” applies to transactions initiated before August 13, 2018. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(c)(1)(ii)), https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-VIII/part-800/subpart-E/section-800.501

SAMR has often preferred to informally prohibit deals by delaying its decision past transactions’ close date, thereby de facto scuttling deals.

Article 2 of the Measures defines foreign investment as “direct or indirect investment activities in mainland China (境内) including (…) foreign investors obtaining equity or assets of domestic mainland Chinese enterprises (境内企业) through mergers and acquisitions.” This could potentially exclude transactions involving companies outside of China’s border.