Note
China’s Harsh Fiscal Winter
China’s aggregate fiscal revenues are likely to decline in 2025, even if China meets its full-year economic growth targets of “around 5%.”
China
We support leaders in the public, corporate, and financial sectors with data-driven analysis of China’s economy, policy dynamics, and commercial ties.
Rhodium Group’s China research is grounded in an objective analysis of economic and policy dynamics, and a laser-like focus on implications for government and business decision-makers. We support the public sector, corporate leadership, and institutional investors’ strategy and decision-making with deep and actionable analysis of China’s economy and its global interactions. Our thought leadership work with philanthropies and think tanks has been a part of Rhodium’s mission since its founding in 2008.
Our latest research
Report
Far From Normal: An Augmented Assessment of China’s State Support
Compared to other countries, China’s approach to industrial policy has been characterized by broader and more entrenched market distortions, deeply systemic rather than targeted, and with a far greater distortive effect on global trade.
Note
Silent Saboteurs: Loaded Assumptions in US AI Policy
We break down the potential fault lines within the five core assumptions implicit in emerging US AI policy. This lets us stress test the US approach and anticipate what the next wave of AI competition will likely entail.
External research
China’s Global Investment in 2024
Newly announced global investment by Chinese companies dropped slightly in 2024 as new investments in battery manufacturing slowed sharply, but completed investment trended up as Chinese firms moved ahead with capital intensive greenfield projects.
External research
Robust Momentum Despite Auto Slowdown: Q4 2024 Update
New global investments by Chinese companies fell in Q4 2024: Despite robust investment in energy and minerals, a continued slowdown in the automotive sector caused an overall decline.
Note
Wind of Change: German China Policy After the Election
An election on February 23 could bring change in Germany’s approach to China. The extent of the shift will depend in part on the makeup of the governing coalition.
Note
How Can China Boost Consumption?
China’s investment-led growth model has reached its limits and household consumption will be the key driver of China’s long-term economic trajectory. Beijing has reform options available, though they vary in financial and political viability.
Report
China and the Future of Global Supply Chains
We review China’s role in four major sectors—apparel, consumer electronics, PV, and autos—over the past decade, then consider four plausible scenarios to 2030 and their implications for China’s future role in global trade and investment patterns.
Our work in the news
See our data and tools
When trustworthy data isn’t readily available, we have successfully built our own models to fill gaps.
China Pathfinder
The China Pathfinder project scores China's market reform across six key areas relative to open market economy norms.
MPER
Helping investors manage their systemic China portfolio risk.
The China Cross-Border Monitor
The China Cross-Border Monitor uses a transaction-based methodology to create a clear picture of China’s overseas investments and business presence.
Services we provide
Rhodium Group provides research, data, and insights that help clients face new challenges and seize new opportunities in China. Our teams have solutions for companies, investors, and governments that operate in or do business with China.
Corporate advisory services
We provide strategic planning support for world-leading tech, industrial, retail, and services companies. With Rhodium’s help, clients can develop robust China+ strategies, uncover new revenue and investment opportunities, map out risks, build mitigation plans, optimize cross-border operations, and stress-test internal assumptions.
Markets research for institutional investors
Our highly experienced analysts take a credit-driven, “follow the money” approach to gauging the inflection points in China’s economic outlook. We have a track record of predicting where China’s economy will go well before it gets there, providing huge value for institutional investors.
Applied public policy research
Our team provides best in class written and visual analysis to help public and private sector clients better understand key questions about China and its relation to the world. By engaging actively in the public debate about China’s interactions with the world, we constantly test our analysis against real world experience with leader-level audiences.
Proprietary data services
Combining cutting-edge technology with deep analytical China expertise, we create data solutions that help public and private sector clients manage risks and seize opportunities connected to China’s development and emerging global footprint.
Learn more about our services
ServicesFootnotes
1.
As pointed out in the WTO analytical index of the SCM Agreement Article 1, the SCM negotiating history shows that the requirement of a financial contribution was intended by its proponents to ensure that not all government measures that conferred benefits could be deemed to be subsidies. This point was extensively discussed during the negotiations, with many participants consistently maintaining that only government actions constituting financial contributions should be subject to the multilateral rules on subsidies and countervailing measures. See the WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement – Article 1 (DS reports), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/subsidies_art1_jur.pdf
2.
In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) and US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs. See the WTO Analytical Index, SCM Agreement – Article 1 (DS reports), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/subsidies_art1_jur.pdf
3.
OECD (2023), “Government support in industrial sectors: A synthesis report,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 270, OECD Publishing, Paris.; Kennedy, Scott, Gerard DiPippo, and Ilaria Mazzocco. Red ink: estimating Chinese industrial policy spending in comparative perspective. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2022. Alexander Brown, François Chimits, Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau, Jacob Gunter, Gregor Sebastian, “Investigating state support for China’s medical technology companies,” Merics, 2023
4.
“Measuring Distortions in International Markets: Below-Market Finance,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, vol. 247, OECD Trade Policy Papers, May 12, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/a1a5aa8a-en; “Government Support in Industrial Sectors: A Synthesis Report,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, vol. 270, OECD Trade Policy Papers, April 7, 2023
5.
“Government Support in the Solar and Wind Value Chains”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 288, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/01/government-support-in-the-solar-and-wind-value-chains_ce793ca0/d82881fd-en.pdf
6.
“How subsidies shape global car and EV production,” OECD Policy Briefs, 28 February 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/how-subsidies-shape-global-car-and-ev-production_ef8aff4f-en.html
7.
DiPippo, Gerard. “Red ink: estimating Chinese industrial policy spending in comparative perspective.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2022.
8.
Alexander Brown, Gregor Sebastian, Francois Chimits, Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau, Jacob Gunter, “Investigating state support for China’s medical technology companies.” MERICS report, November 2023.
9.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: The Aluminium Value Chain,” OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 218, 2019, 78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.
10.
Ibid.
11.
Branstetter L. G., Li G. and Ren M. (2022). “Picking Winners? Government Subsidies and Firm Productivity in China.” NBER Working Paper no. 30699.
12.
Nie Huihua, Li Guangwu, and Li Chen, “Eight key issues on enterprise subsidies” (关于企业补贴的八个关键问题), 2022, http://www.niehuihua.com/uploads/soft/220801/1-220P1230043.pdf
13.
OECD (2024), “Quantifying the role of state enterprises in industrial subsidies,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 282, OECD Publishing, Paris.
14.
Chimits, François. “What Do We Know About Chinese Industrial Subsidies?” CEPII Policy Brief 2023-42 (2023).
15.
Kennedy, Scott, Gerard DiPippo, and Ilaria Mazzocco. Red ink: estimating Chinese industrial policy spending in comparative perspective. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2022.
16.
Nie Huihua, Li Guangwu, Li Chen, “关于企业补贴的八个关键问题—兼评当下的产业政策研究” (Eight key issues regarding enterprise subsidies), Academic Monthly, 2022, 54(6): 47-60.
17.
Neware, “China’s ‘White List’ of Power Battery Companies Abolished,” 28 June 2019.
18.
Chiang, Ting-Wei. “Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and WTO’s Anti-Subsidy Regime.” Geo. J. Int’l L. 49 (2017): 845.
19.
Economic Daily, “税务总局：加计扣除政策力促科技创新 [State Administration of Taxation: Super Deduction Policy Promotes Technological Innovation Policy Interpretation],” July 13, 2023. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202307/content_6891666.htm
20.
OECD (2023), “Government support in industrial sectors: A synthesis report,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 270, OECD Publishing.
21.
Diheng Xu, Interactions Between Chinese Tax Incentives and WTO’s Subsidy Rules Against the Background of EU State Aid. Springer Nature, 2023.
22.
Chiang, Ting-Wei. “Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and WTO’s Anti-Subsidy Regime.” Geo. J. Int’l L. 49 (2017): 845.
23.
OECD (2021), “Measuring distortions in international markets: Below-market finance,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 247.
24.
OECD (2023), “Measuring distortions in international markets: The rolling-stock value chain,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 267, OECD Publishing, Paris
25.
Report of the Appellate Body on the “United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China” dispute
26.
OECD (2021), “Measuring distortions in international markets: Below-market finance,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 247, OECD Publishing, Paris
27.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: Below-Market Finance,” OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 247, 2021, 15. https://doi.org/10.1787/a1a5aa8a-en.
28.
Henderson, J. Vernon, et al. “Political manipulation of urban land markets: Evidence from China.” Journal of Public Economics 214 (2022): 104730.
29.
He, Zhiguo, et al. Industrial land discount in China: a public finance perspective. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022.
30.
IMF, People’s Republic of China: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 2023/081, February 10, 2023
31.
Fan, Jianchao, Jing Liu, and Yinggang Zhou. Investing like conglomerates: is diversification a blessing or curse for China’s local governments? Bank for International Settlements, Monetary and Economic Department, 2021.
32.
Peek, Joe, and Eric S. Rosengren. “Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan.” American Economic Review 95.4 (2005): 1144-1166. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828054825691
33.
Zhao, Jingchen, and Chuyi Wei. “Zombie companies in China in the COVID‐19 era.” International Insolvency Review 32.2 (2023): 309-335.
34.
“OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019,” OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019.
35.
Sykes, A. (2021), “The Law and Economics of “Forced” Technology Transfer and Its Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the US–China Trade War),” Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 13/1, pp. 127-171
36.
OECD (2024), “Quantifying the role of state enterprises in industrial subsidies,” OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 282, OECD Publishing, Paris
37.
Cahill, Dermot, and Jing Wang. “How competition ideals are emasculated in key industries in China, and pathways to reform.” Fordham Int’l LJ 44 (2020): 609.
38.
Koss, Daniel. “Party building as institutional bricolage: asserting authority at the business frontier.” The China Quarterly 248.S1 (2021): 222-243.
39.
Bai, Chong-En, et al. The rise of state-connected private owners in China. No. w28170. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020.
40.
Isabella Weber and Hao Qi, “The State-Constituted Market Economy: A Conceptual Framework for China’s State-Market Relations,” UMass Amherst, 2022. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/319/.
41.
Camille Boullenois and Charles Austin Jordan, “How China’s Overcapacity Holds Back Emerging Economies,” Rhodium Group, 2024
42.
High-performance semiconductor restriction covers all items previously restricted for export to China and other US arms-embargoed countries under the October 17, 2023 chip controls (ECCN 3A090.a, 4A090.a, and related .z items.)
43.
Supplement No. 4 to part 742 country list includes EU members (minus Cyprus and Malta) plus UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Canada. Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (Singapore, South Korea excluded.)
44.
HBM is produced by stacking and connecting multiple DRAM silicon dies vertically to achieve high memory density and accelerated data transfer rates.
45.
The Foundry Due Dilligence rule requires “front-end fabricators” like TSMC to presume any advanced logic chip meets the performance thresholds stipulated in ECCN 3A090.a and are thus subject to US high-performance chip controls unless one of three conditions is met: 1) the chip designer is on a list of “approved” IC designers included in the appendix to the rule, and that designer attests that the chip falls below the ECCN 3A090 threshold; 2) The chip is packaged by a front-end fabricator located outside Country Group D:5 (China and other US arms embargoed countries) or Macau, which verifies that the chip does not contain HBM and has fewer than 30 billion transistors (gradually raised to 40 billion by 2029); or 3) the chip is packaged by an “approved” outsourced semiconductor assembly and test provider (OSAT), which verifies that the chip does not contain HBM or 30 billion+ transistors.
46.
To evaluate which countries are most capable of providing a large amount of available energy capacity to scale AI compute quickly, we first focus on the countries with the fastest recent capacity build rates around the world. We adjust recent capacity additions by country based on average capacity factors and estimate how much new generation a country has added over the past five years that is surplus to what is required to meet demand growth over the same period. This allows for a consistent cross-country assessment of each country’s potential to meet the expected near-term surge in AI demand.
47.
Consumer electronics for the purpose of this section include laptops, desktop computers, smartphones, and tablets—as well as key inputs and components. See the methodological appendix for more detail of each category.