Rhodium Group provides research, data, and insights that help clients understand and respond to new challenges and opportunities in China. Our teams have solutions for companies, investors, and governments that operate in or do business with China.
Global businesses face a new set of challenges and opportunities in China, and Rhodium Group is uniquely suited to help. We provide strategic planning support for world-leading tech, industrial, retail, and services companies. With our help, clients can develop robust China+ strategies, uncover new revenue and investment opportunities, map out risks, build mitigation plans, optimize cross-border operations, and stress-test internal assumptions.
We engage in tailored client relationships combining advisory support, access to Rhodium Group expertise, client-only data and research, and executive briefings on economic and policy dynamics in China, the US, and Europe, with a laser focus on implications for business strategy. We also support clients through forward-looking custom projects including supply chain and technology risk reviews, strategy red-teaming, scenario-planning, tabletop strategy exercises, and diversification planning.
Report
Policy attention has fixated on chips, the cloud, and models. But crafting a durable AI strategy will require a broader approach reconciling industrial capacity, geopolitical realities, and rapid evolution of the technology.
Note
Trade deals with the EU and potentially the US, alongside other countries’ rising barriers to Chinese goods, offer India an opportunity to capture global export share, even as its manufacturing ecosystem remains less competitive.
Note
In just a few years, Chinese OEMs have gone from zero to almost 30% market share, and a whopping 90% of EV sales. The question now is how much more market share Chinese OEMs can gain in the country.
The direction of China’s economy is of massive importance for investors. Our team provides an independent and unbiased view of China’s macroeconomy and policy choices that institutional investors need. Our highly experienced analysts take a credit-driven, “follow the money” approach to gauging the inflection points in China’s economic outlook. We have a track record of predicting where China’s economy will go well before it gets there, providing huge value for institutional investors.
Our team provides clients with seven to ten research notes per month that cut through the noise of China-related news and provide meaningful signals of China-related trends as they impact major asset markets. Clients can also engage in active and open conversation with our experts, bolstering their own in-house research capabilities.
Note
As China and other countries engage in new forms of resource nationalism—attempting to control key industrial inputs at home—the results are strained global supply chains and new constraints on China’s growth.
Note
We estimate China will lose nearly 60 million people in the next decade, roughly equivalent to the population of France. The impact on household consumption is obvious, but the larger problem for Beijing may be the hit to social security funds.
Report
China's rapid expansion of electricity and concentration of upstream materials production has created a strong pro-cyclical environment that is difficult to compete with and almost impossible to replicate.
Our team combines data-driven China macroeconomic analysis with deep knowledge of its global context to support decision-making in policy and commerce. Our team provides best in class written and visual analysis to help public and private sector clients better understand key questions about China and its relation to the world. Is Xi Jinping shifting the country toward a reform path? How does China’s slowdown impact its R&D spending and competitiveness? And how can other governments compare industrial competitiveness in leading-edge technology with Chinese counterparts?
By engaging actively in the public debate about China’s interactions with the world, we constantly test our analysis against real world experience with leader-level audiences. Our analysis—and the feedback it gets from practitioners—improves public and private understanding of China’s outlook.
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China dominates manufacturing of intermediate goods that use critical materials as inputs, creating an additional layer of chokepoints, which Beijing is targeting in its most recent export controls—including outside of China.
Report
China’s industrial strategy now touches almost every major sector in the economy and their underlying supply chains. These state interventions are accelerating China’s trade dominance and expanding foreign dependence on Chinese supply chains.
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China's actual 2025 GDP growth fell short of 3%. For domestic demand to lift China above 2% GDP growth in 2026, Beijing must reverse the systemic causes of household and business malaise or pile on costly demand subsidies.
Good policy and business decisions require transparency. Combining cutting-edge technology with deep analytical China expertise, we create data solutions that help public and private sector clients manage risks and seize opportunities connected to China’s development and emerging global footprint.
Our proprietary datasets combine official statistics, open source intelligence and China expertise to provide transparency in key areas of public policy interest, such as China’s domestic financial flows, its global investment footprint or the trajectory of China de-risking. Our data solutions for clients combine proprietary datasets with analytics and bespoke advisory tailored to their needs.
Data Insight
Mining dominated announced Chinese outbound investment in Q2 2026, driven by new acquisitions and the expansion of previously acquired operations.
Note
Chinese overseas clean tech investment is growing but not as large as some headlines suggest, according to new data on FDI by Chinese companies abroad across the EV, solar PV, and wind turbine value chains.
Report
Building on a long-standing collaboration between Rhodium Group and MERICS, this report summarizes China’s investment footprint in the EU-27 and the UK in 2025, analyzing policy developments and the shifting patterns in China’s FDI.
The China Cross-Border Monitor (CBM) tracks aggregate FDI trends and data on China's global investment activity for academic researchers and journalists
Rhodium Group’s China Investment Risk Analytics (CIRA) screens Chinese issuers and portfolios for sanctions exposure, critical technology positioning, party-state ties, military affiliations, and emerging controversies.
For the purposes of this study, we group the US and its partners into a “G7+” bloc comprising the G7 (US, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, all EU) plus South Korea, Taiwan, Norway, Australia, Mexico, and Israel.
Rovjok material flows analysis of germanium, 2024.
Unless otherwise noted we assume current US hardware when stating GWs of data center capacity.
YMTC responded to its US entity listing by leaning heavily into partnerships with local SME suppliers and has reportedly achieved over 50% localization of its tool base. Crucially, 3D NAND production does not rely heavily on advanced lithography and is more dependent on advanced etch and deposition tools—areas where local alternatives to G7+ products from emerging suppliers like Naura and AMEC are relatively more developed.
Epoch AI, database of AI Models-notable AI models, last updated on January 12, 2026, https://epoch.ai/data/ai-models. According to Epoch AI, a notable model meets any of the following criteria: (i) state-of-the-art improvement on a recognized benchmark; (ii) highly cited (over 1000 citations); (iii) historical relevance; (iv) significant use. A model is attributed to a country if at least one author of the introducing paper is affiliated with an institution based there. Models with authors from multiple countries may therefore be double counted.
Note that Liang refers to active parameters, not total. Several Chinese models released since have far larger total counts, including Kimi K3 with 2.8 trillion parameters. But these are mixture-of-experts architectures activating only a fraction per token; Kimi K3 activates an estimated 50–100 billion parameters.
Adam Jonas et al., “The Humanoid 100: Mapping the Humanoid Robot Value Chain,” Morgan Stanley Research, February 6, 2025.
See Shandong Coal Machinery Industry Association, “详细解读’专精特新’最新认定标准和流程 [A Detailed Interpretation of the Latest Identification Standards and Processes of ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel (SSCN)’],“ March 2, 2023, http://www.sdmjw.org.cn/HYPY/03021506.html; People’s Daily, “财政部：进一步加大对国家级专精特新’小巨人’企业支持力度 [Ministry of Finance: Further Increase Support for National-Level Specialized and New ‘Little Giant’ Enterprises],“ February 18, 2022, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1725093696186722910&wfr=spider&for=pc; Jiangsu Association for Science and Technology, “31省市’专精特新’政策汇总（一） [Summary of 31 Provinces and Cities’ ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel’ Policies (1)],“ October 25, 2022, http://www.jscxxh.org.cn/detail.html?id=1124.
See European Union Chamber of Commerce, Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda (2016); Chen Linxi et al., “China’s Capacity Reduction Reform and Its Impact on Producer Prices,“ IMF Working Papers 2018, no. 216, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484375914.001.
During the 2016-2018 overcapacity campaign, M&As were a core restructuring tool. In steel, M&As were incentivized through credit support and dedicated fiscal funds, while in aluminum it was embedded in a binding capacity-replacement mechanism. In the current framework, M&A is no longer binding: In steel, incentives are limited to more favorable capacity-replacement ratios, while in aluminum it is only encouraged. Recent measures have expanded financing channels for M&A but remain non-sector specific and do not introduce binding enforcement mechanisms.
OilChem, https://en.oilchem.net/.
Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020 (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios China-México (CECHIMEX), Facultad de Economía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021).
Early examples of scenario based development include Ministry of Science and Technology et al., “关于加快场景创新以人工智能高水平应用促进经济高质量发展的指导意见 [Guiding Opinions on Accelerating Scenario Innovation to Promote High-Quality Economic Development Through High-Level Application of Artificial Intelligence],“ July 29, 2022 (published August 12, 2022), https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2022/202208/t20220812_181851.html.
Rhodium Group analysis of Peking University, PKU Law (ChinaLawInfo) database, https://www.pkulaw.com/.
See Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #275: What Does China’s Government Procurement Market Tell Us about Large Model Diffusion?,“ ChinAI Newsletter, July 29, 2024, https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-275-what-does-chinas-government; Tech Buzz China Insider, “The State of Chinese AI Apps 2025,“ October 27, 2025, https://techbuzzchina.substack.com/p/the-state-of-chinese-ai-apps-2025.
China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, “China Artificial Intelligence Industry Development Report (2025) [人工智能产业发展研究报告（2025年）],“ January 2026, http://caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202602/t20260202_712679.htm.
Ibid.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Two Loops: How China’s Open AI Strategy Reinforces its industrial Dominance (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2026).
Brian Deese et al., “Global Clean Investment Monitor: Government Support for Electric Vehicles and Batteries,“ Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, July 2025, https://ceepr.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/MIT-CEEPR-RC-2025-02.pdf.
See Yifan Wei, Yuen Yuen Ang, and Nan Jia, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Government Guidance Funds in China,“ The China Quarterly 256 (2023): 939–959, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741023000280; Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
Tracked by the National Bureau of Statistics for companies above a certain threshold.
Tiago Devesa, et al., “Geopolitics and geometry of global trade: 2026 update: Tariff splashes, AI waves, and the ripples reshaping global trade,“ McKinsey Global Institute, March 2026.
European Chamber of Commerce, “Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda,“ 2016.
According to ADB MRIO input-output tables at constant 2010 prices.
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, Exporting Control: China’s New Strategic Toolkit (Beijing: European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2026).
“Xi Jinping Presided over the Second Meeting of the Central Committee for the Comprehensive Rule of Law and Delivered an Important Speech,” Xinhua, February 25, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-02/25/content_5368422.htm
“Make Good Use of Legal Weapons to Safeguard National Interests: Strengthen the Construction of Foreign-Related Rule of Law System,” People’s Daily, January 11, 2021, www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202101/2e4dafe2a53342609191ab522b88dfc2.shtml.
Chang An Jian, “Chen Yixin Published a Signed Article in the People’s Daily: Studying and Implementing Xi Jinping’s Rule of Law Needs to Grasp the Ten Major Relationships,” Legal Daily, December 7, 2021, www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2021-12/07/content_8639612.htm.
Figures sourced from listed firm financial disclosures on Bloomberg.
According to Rhodium Group’s China Outbound Intelligence data
Jennie Bai, et al., “The Ripple Effects of China’s Global Ownership,” The American Finance Association, April 2024.
In explaining the FAI decline, NBS has emphasized the property sector downturn and the impact of weak corporate profitability on investor sentiment. It has not, however, explained why the FAI decline is not reflected in GDP data. There are important definitional differences between FAI and GCF, including separate treatment of land sales, second-hand equipment purchases, and inventory adjustments, among others, but these differences are unlikely to fully account for the data discrepancy that emerged in Q3.
For the purposes of this report, “clean technologies” refers exclusively to electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar PV. It does not include energy infrastructure deployment, such as wind farms or solar farms.
For more details on official government statistics, see Rhodium Group’s The Next Generation of China’s Outbound Investment: https://cbm.rhg.com/research-note/next-generation-chinas-outbound-investment
According to Rhodium Group’s China Cross-Border Monitor.
United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “Global foreign investment up 14% in 2025, with growth concentrated in developed economies” https://unctad.org/news/global-foreign-investment-14-2025-growth-concentrated-developed-economies. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Mayger, James and Do Rosario, Jorgelina. Bloomberg (2026). “IMF Warns China’s Economic Policies Are Causing Damage to Others” February, 18. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-18/imf-warns-china-s-economic-policies-are-causing-damage-to-others. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Boullenois, Camille and Williams, Gregor and Wright, Logan. Rhodium Group (2025). “Malign Indifference: China’s Currency and the Threat to Europe” December, 18. https://rhg.com/research/malign-indifference-chinas-currency-and-the-threat-to-europe/. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (BMWE). „Investment Screening in Germany: Facts & Figures,“ https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/investment-screening-in-germany-facts-figures.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Foster, Peter and Borrett, Amy and Dunai, Marton and Minder, Raphael. Financial Times (2025). “China’s investment push in Europe hits a wall” October, 20. https://www.ft.com/content/093de2c1-162a-44c4-b954-15db3c856047. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Prudhomme, Cécile and Boutelet, Cécile. Le Monde (2025). “Amid Shein controversy, Chinese e-commerce giant JD.com sets sights on European market” November, 13. https://archive.is/kR6cn#selection-2049.387-2109.322. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Business Insider (2025). “Chinesische Autohersteller wollen angeblich diese VW-Werke in Deutschland kaufen“ January, 27. https://www.businessinsider.de/wirtschaft/mobility/vw-chinas-autohersteller-wollen-angeblich-deutsche-werke-kaufen/. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Council of the European Union. “Strengthening EU economic security” https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16389-2025-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Bounds, Andy and Foy, Henry and Dunai, Marton. Financial Times (2025). “EU probes BYD plant in Hungary over unfair Chinese subsidies” March, 20. https://www.ft.com/content/0ef28741-6194-4ee6-8f23-945415de7458?syn-25a6b1a6=1. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
Laprévote, François-Charles et al. Concurrences (2025). “The Chinese Ministry of Commerce issues a final determination on a trade and investment barrier investigation into the EU’s FSR” January, 9. https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/january-2025/the-chinese-ministry-of-commerce-issues-a-final-determination-on-a-trade-and. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
