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Rhodium Group’s China research is grounded in an objective analysis of economic and policy dynamics, and a laser-like focus on implications for government and business decision-makers. We support the public sector, corporate leadership, and institutional investors’ strategy and decision-making with deep and actionable analysis of China’s economy and its global interactions. Our thought leadership work with philanthropies and think tanks has been a part of Rhodium’s mission since its founding in 2008.
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China dominates manufacturing of intermediate goods that use critical materials as inputs, creating an additional layer of chokepoints, which Beijing is targeting in its most recent export controls—including outside of China.
Report
China’s industrial strategy now touches almost every major sector in the economy and their underlying supply chains. These state interventions are accelerating China’s trade dominance and expanding foreign dependence on Chinese supply chains.
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Client exclusive
By now, you’ve read countless articles about how little is expected to come out of the Beijing summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping from May 14 to 15: soybean and jet purchases, some lightweight pledges, and a gaggle of CEOs in tow for…
External research
New data from Rhodium Group’s China Cross-Border Monitor (CBM) shows that mainland Chinese companies announced 128 major FDI transactions in Q1 2026 with an estimated total value of $26.3 billion.
External research
Chinese FDI in the US has fallen significantly from its 2016 peak and remained at low levels for the past five years. The reality of the bilateral relationship makes a meaningful rebound of Chinese FDI in the US unlikely.
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We estimate China will lose nearly 60 million people in the next decade, roughly equivalent to the population of France. The impact on household consumption is obvious, but the larger problem for Beijing may be the hit to social security funds.
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A year and a half after the EU's new duties on China-made EVs, imports are still accelerating. The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act is one possible fix, but even in its strongest form, it might not be enough to shield European carmakers.
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China's rapid expansion of electricity and concentration of upstream materials production has created a strong pro-cyclical environment that is difficult to compete with and almost impossible to replicate.
When trustworthy data isn’t readily available, we have successfully built our own models to fill gaps.
Rhodium Group’s China Investment Risk Analytics (CIRA) screens Chinese issuers and portfolios for sanctions exposure, critical technology positioning, party-state ties, military affiliations, and emerging controversies.
The China Cross-Border Monitor uses a transaction-based methodology to create a clear picture of China’s overseas investments and business presence.
The China Pathfinder project scores China's market reform across six key areas relative to open market economy norms.
Rhodium Group provides research, data, and insights that help clients face new challenges and seize new opportunities in China. Our teams have solutions for companies, investors, and governments that operate in or do business with China.
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See Shandong Coal Machinery Industry Association, “详细解读’专精特新’最新认定标准和流程 [A Detailed Interpretation of the Latest Identification Standards and Processes of ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel (SSCN)’],“ March 2, 2023, http://www.sdmjw.org.cn/HYPY/03021506.html; People’s Daily, “财政部：进一步加大对国家级专精特新’小巨人’企业支持力度 [Ministry of Finance: Further Increase Support for National-Level Specialized and New ‘Little Giant’ Enterprises],“ February 18, 2022, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1725093696186722910&wfr=spider&for=pc; Jiangsu Association for Science and Technology, “31省市’专精特新’政策汇总（一） [Summary of 31 Provinces and Cities’ ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel’ Policies (1)],“ October 25, 2022, http://www.jscxxh.org.cn/detail.html?id=1124.
See European Union Chamber of Commerce, Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda (2016); Chen Linxi et al., “China’s Capacity Reduction Reform and Its Impact on Producer Prices,“ IMF Working Papers 2018, no. 216, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484375914.001.
During the 2016-2018 overcapacity campaign, M&As were a core restructuring tool. In steel, M&As were incentivized through credit support and dedicated fiscal funds, while in aluminum it was embedded in a binding capacity-replacement mechanism. In the current framework, M&A is no longer binding: In steel, incentives are limited to more favorable capacity-replacement ratios, while in aluminum it is only encouraged. Recent measures have expanded financing channels for M&A but remain non-sector specific and do not introduce binding enforcement mechanisms.
OilChem, https://en.oilchem.net/.
Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020 (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios China-México (CECHIMEX), Facultad de Economía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021).
Early examples of scenario based development include Ministry of Science and Technology et al., “关于加快场景创新以人工智能高水平应用促进经济高质量发展的指导意见 [Guiding Opinions on Accelerating Scenario Innovation to Promote High-Quality Economic Development Through High-Level Application of Artificial Intelligence],“ July 29, 2022 (published August 12, 2022), https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2022/202208/t20220812_181851.html.
Rhodium Group analysis of Peking University, PKU Law (ChinaLawInfo) database, https://www.pkulaw.com/.
See Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #275: What Does China’s Government Procurement Market Tell Us about Large Model Diffusion?,“ ChinAI Newsletter, July 29, 2024, https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-275-what-does-chinas-government; Tech Buzz China Insider, “The State of Chinese AI Apps 2025,“ October 27, 2025, https://techbuzzchina.substack.com/p/the-state-of-chinese-ai-apps-2025.
China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, “China Artificial Intelligence Industry Development Report (2025) [人工智能产业发展研究报告（2025年）],“ January 2026, http://caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202602/t20260202_712679.htm.
Ibid.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Two Loops: How China’s Open AI Strategy Reinforces its industrial Dominance (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2026).
Brian Deese et al., “Global Clean Investment Monitor: Government Support for Electric Vehicles and Batteries,“ Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, July 2025, https://ceepr.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/MIT-CEEPR-RC-2025-02.pdf.
See Yifan Wei, Yuen Yuen Ang, and Nan Jia, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Government Guidance Funds in China,“ The China Quarterly 256 (2023): 939–959, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741023000280; Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
Tracked by the National Bureau of Statistics for companies above a certain threshold.
Tiago Devesa, et al., “Geopolitics and geometry of global trade: 2026 update: Tariff splashes, AI waves, and the ripples reshaping global trade,“ McKinsey Global Institute, March 2026.
European Chamber of Commerce, “Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda,“ 2016.
According to ADB MRIO input-output tables at constant 2010 prices.
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, Exporting Control: China’s New Strategic Toolkit (Beijing: European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2026).
“Xi Jinping Presided over the Second Meeting of the Central Committee for the Comprehensive Rule of Law and Delivered an Important Speech,” Xinhua, February 25, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-02/25/content_5368422.htm
“Make Good Use of Legal Weapons to Safeguard National Interests: Strengthen the Construction of Foreign-Related Rule of Law System,” People’s Daily, January 11, 2021, www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202101/2e4dafe2a53342609191ab522b88dfc2.shtml.
Chang An Jian, “Chen Yixin Published a Signed Article in the People’s Daily: Studying and Implementing Xi Jinping’s Rule of Law Needs to Grasp the Ten Major Relationships,” Legal Daily, December 7, 2021, www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2021-12/07/content_8639612.htm.
Figures sourced from listed firm financial disclosures on Bloomberg.
According to Rhodium Group’s China Outbound Intelligence data
Jennie Bai, et al., “The Ripple Effects of China’s Global Ownership,” The American Finance Association, April 2024.
