All Fun and Games? Modeling Outcomes from the Board of Trade

The most concrete outcome of the Trump-Xi summit in Washington was an announcement on proposed mutual tariff reductions under the bilateral Board of Trade framework. While both sides quickly framed the deal as a reciprocal “30 for 30” swap, a close read of the two lists reveals notable asymmetries that could produce uneven outcomes. First, while Beijing’s import list consists mainly of food products and inputs that it needs but has readily obtained from other sources, Washington’s import list is full of consumer goods that the United States overwhelmingly buys from China, tariffs or no tariffs. Second, China’s proposed tariff reductions are both deeper (with tariff rates falling nearly twice as far on average) and wider in scope (covering over twenty times as many individual products across many sectors) than the US commitments. These asymmetries leave ambiguity regarding the ultimate effect of the agreement.

Simulating the proposed cuts using a leading trade model, we estimate that the Board of Trade could create export opportunities, with annual global US goods exports rising by up to $10.3 billion and global Chinese goods exports rising by up to $11.0 billion relative to the status quo. Like other analysts, our estimates have grown more complete as more post-summit information became available. We find that the agreement would thus expand overall exports rather than primarily redirect existing sales between markets. Furthermore, lower tariffs could reduce prices for covered goods in both economies, with potentially greater relief for US buyers where alternative suppliers have been limited.

Overall, our model results indicate US exporters could benefit, provided that non-tariff barriers and other restrictions in China do not hamper meaningful new demand for US products. On the other hand, China’s export gains—and price relief for US consumers in products covered by the agreement—appear more certain.

Comparing product coverage and tariff reductions

The most concrete outcome of the recent US-China leaders’ summit in Washington was the release of new details on the Board of Trade. As part of the launch, both sides released a set of products deemed non-sensitive and eligible for tariff reduction. Each list was designed to add up to roughly $30 billion in bilateral imports in 2024, a mutually agreed reference year prior to the disruptive tariff actions of 2025. The US imports list includes consumer goods such as toys, games, holiday décor, and other common household items, while the China imports list covers a range of agricultural products, timber, coal, and medical devices. While the timing of potential tariff reductions remains unclear, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) stated that “about 90%” of Board of Trade products would see tariff rates fall to Most Favored Nation (MFN) levels.¹

US commitments: mostly toys and games

The US list primarily covers consumer and household goods, including toys and games, small appliances, kitchenware, and holiday and sporting goods. By and large, these are products the US has historically imported from China (Figure 1). As a result, the US concessions largely reduce the cost of established trade flows, which will likely offer price relief for everyday consumer purchases.

China’s commitments: agriculture and coal

China’s list, on the other hand, includes agricultural products, coal, and other goods of core interest to the Trump administration, like medical devices. While these are all categories where Beijing is actively looking to reduce dependence on the US, steep declines in Chinese imports of Board of Trade goods in recent years—from $40 billion in 2021 to $30 billion in 2024 and under $20 billion in 2025—may give Beijing some headroom to lower tariffs (Figure 2).

Beijing was also careful to preserve important bargaining chips. Soybeans, crude oil, and propane—all major US exports to China—were not included on the Board of Trade list. Categories like semiconductors and aircraft parts, where the US has restricted exports to China and where China has at times limited purchases of US goods, were also not included. Instead, the US and China are choosing to negotiate separately on other key areas, as seen in reports that China may allow some NVIDIA chip sales to ByteDance and Alibaba.

Comparing the scope and depth of tariff concessions

One striking difference between the two sides’ lists is their sheer length. China agreed to lower tariffs on far more products than the US did. China’s import list features 1,619 8-digit codes, compared with only 77 items on the US list.

Curiously, over half of the products on China’s list are goods that China has not imported at all from the United States in the recent past. As many as 945 items that China included are products for which it recorded no imports from the US in 2025, compared with only two US-listed products without imports from China (Figure 3). Even examining all bilateral trade since 2020, China has recorded zero imports from the US for 634 Board of Trade products.

China’s proposed tariff concessions are substantially deeper than those of the US, though China’s tariffs would remain higher on average. Assuming both sides reduce all tariffs on their respective lists to MFN rates, China’s trade-weighted average tariff on listed goods would fall from 41.7% to 13.7%, a reduction of 28.0 percentage points (pp).² The corresponding US average tariff would fall from 17.2% to 1.6%, a reduction of 15.6pp. US average tariff cuts at the 6-digit level are concentrated between 10 and 20pp (61% of goods represented on the Board of Trade fall in this range). By comparison, nearly 40% of China’s cuts would exceed 30pp, compared with just 2% of US products.

Zooming in on the largest traded products on each list, China’s tariff reductions still appear larger. Aggregated to the 6-digit level, the ten largest imports on the US list would see reductions in the range of 0-26pp, compared with 14-51pp for China (Figures 4 and 5).

Assessing export potential

Cheaper Chinese exports of goods in the agreement will benefit US households currently facing higher prices. The US import list is full of consumer products it predominantly buys from China, despite current tariffs (Figure 6). Although China’s share of US imports of Board of Trade products declined 10pp amid elevated tariffs in 2025, it still accounted for 65% and could readily rebound with lowered trade barriers. US consumers will likely benefit from import price reductions more than China, given China’s lower level of import dependence on the US made it easier for its importers to avoid tariff-related costs.

Given China’s steeper tariff reductions, US exporters may have even greater upside, but securing opportunities relies on creating new Chinese demand for US products.  As noted above, China’s product list includes many goods that it has not recently imported from the United States. In most cases, these are goods that the United States exports to other countries and that China currently sources from elsewhere (Figure 7). However, true US gains will require new production and exports to meet Chinese demand, not simply shifting around preexisting trade flows.

Modeling the impact of the agreement

To test our analysis of the two lists, we simulated the agreement’s potential economic impacts using the Kiel Institute Trade Policy Evaluation (KITE) model. To do so, we first established a baseline of global bilateral tariff rates between 80 countries and a rest-of-world aggregate in 50 sectors present in global OECD input-output tables, using tariff data from the WTO as of late-September 2026. We then lowered US-China bilateral tariffs in affected sectors to levels proposed under the Board of Trade, and used the model to simulate how production, prices, and trade patterns across different economies might change relative to the status quo baseline.

Overall, the results indicate that US goods exports to China could increase by approximately $10.6 billion, while China’s goods exports to the US could rise by $11.4 billion, relative to the baseline in which pre-agreement tariffs remain in place indefinitely (Tables 1 and 2). These results are sensitive to discretionary choices around tariff aggregation from individual products to the broader sectors used in the model. See the attached Methodological Appendix for full details and additional results under alternative assumptions.

US increases are spread across several sectors, led by food products ($3.4 billion), agriculture ($1.7 billion), and chemicals ($1.4 billion). Coal exports also rise sharply from a small baseline. Conversely, China’s modeled gains are more concentrated. Household items, including textiles and bedroom linens, toys, and games account for roughly 80% of its estimated additional exports.

Importantly, the results show a $10.3 billion increase in total US goods exports to all trading partners, meaning only about $0.3 billion of the bilateral export gains are offset by lower US exports to other destinations. For comparison, China’s total goods exports to the world are modeled to increase by $11.0 billion. Moreover, we conservatively assume that products without any recent bilateral trade receive zero weight in our tariff aggregation, so tariff rate reductions on those do not contribute to export gains in the model. Any potential trade creation in those categories therefore represents an additional upside opportunity for US exporters.

Monitoring will be key to the agreement’s success

Both our analysis of the announced product lists and our model simulations suggest that the Board of Trade could open opportunities for US exporters and consumers, provided the tariff cuts are implemented faithfully. In practice, however, several obstacles could limit these potential gains, particularly on the US export side.

Non-tariff barriers could limit practical improvements to US market access in China. China’s imports of the agricultural products and other raw materials that comprise most of its list are purchased by a small number of state-owned enterprises, giving Beijing the ability to influence import decisions irrespective of tariff rates. Behind-the-border barriers such as import licensing requirements, product approvals, and customs procedures could also prevent the Board of Trade from realizing its full potential.

In addition, there is reason to believe that China’s existing tariff rates on its imports from the US are lower than our baseline scenario assumes, given its opaque set of company-specific exemptions and product exclusions. While the full scope of these exemptions is not publicly known, if China’s actual tariff rates are lower than advertised, this could limit US export gains when formal tariff rates are dropped.

For these reasons, sustained monitoring is essential to ensure the Board of Trade’s success. The agreement will take time to implement, as each side secures support from domestic stakeholders and passes through legal procedures. Speaking at the G20 Trade Ministerial in Milwaukee, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said it was unlikely that US consumers would see lower tariffs on goods before the holiday season. But if successful, the Board of Trade promises to serve as an effective pressure-release valve for the bilateral relationship. According to the official Working Procedures and Terms of Reference, the two sides will meet at least once per quarter, and can also establish working groups to resolve issues in specific areas, such as agriculture. These working-level forums would provide an important venue for both sides to air trade-related grievances.

In any scenario, the Board of Trade will not fundamentally rebalance US-China trade. The “30-for-30” framework encompasses only 6.5% of 2024 US imports from China and 18.2% of China’s imports from the US. Even if the US reduces all tariff rates on its import list to MFN levels, the overall trade-weighted average tariff on US imports from China would fall by just over one percentage point, given the list’s limited scope and high US tariffs on most of its other imports from China. Meanwhile, USTR will soon release its wide-ranging Section 301 investigation into global excess capacity. These tariffs will alter the US trading profile and potentially impact the implementation of the Board of Trade agreement. When we have more details on these tariffs, we will release new modeling results.