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ServicesFootnotes
1.
For the purposes of this report, “clean technologies” refers exclusively to electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar PV. It does not include energy infrastructure deployment, such as wind farms or solar farms.
2.
For more details on official government statistics, see Rhodium Group’s The Next Generation of China’s Outbound Investment: https://cbm.rhg.com/research-note/next-generation-chinas-outbound-investment
3.
According to Rhodium Group’s China Cross-Border Monitor.
4.
United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “Global foreign investment up 14% in 2025, with growth concentrated in developed economies” https://unctad.org/news/global-foreign-investment-14-2025-growth-concentrated-developed-economies. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
5.
Mayger, James and Do Rosario, Jorgelina. Bloomberg (2026). “IMF Warns China’s Economic Policies Are Causing Damage to Others” February, 18. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-18/imf-warns-china-s-economic-policies-are-causing-damage-to-others. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
6.
Boullenois, Camille and Williams, Gregor and Wright, Logan. Rhodium Group (2025). “Malign Indifference: China’s Currency and the Threat to Europe” December, 18. https://rhg.com/research/malign-indifference-chinas-currency-and-the-threat-to-europe/. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
7.
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (BMWE). „Investment Screening in Germany: Facts & Figures,“ https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/investment-screening-in-germany-facts-figures.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
8.
Foster, Peter and Borrett, Amy and Dunai, Marton and Minder, Raphael. Financial Times (2025). “China’s investment push in Europe hits a wall” October, 20. https://www.ft.com/content/093de2c1-162a-44c4-b954-15db3c856047. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
9.
Prudhomme, Cécile and Boutelet, Cécile. Le Monde (2025). “Amid Shein controversy, Chinese e-commerce giant JD.com sets sights on European market” November, 13. https://archive.is/kR6cn#selection-2049.387-2109.322. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
10.
Business Insider (2025). “Chinesische Autohersteller wollen angeblich diese VW-Werke in Deutschland kaufen“ January, 27. https://www.businessinsider.de/wirtschaft/mobility/vw-chinas-autohersteller-wollen-angeblich-deutsche-werke-kaufen/. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
11.
Council of the European Union. “Strengthening EU economic security” https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16389-2025-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
12.
Bounds, Andy and Foy, Henry and Dunai, Marton. Financial Times (2025). “EU probes BYD plant in Hungary over unfair Chinese subsidies” March, 20. https://www.ft.com/content/0ef28741-6194-4ee6-8f23-945415de7458?syn-25a6b1a6=1. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
13.
Laprévote, François-Charles et al. Concurrences (2025). “The Chinese Ministry of Commerce issues a final determination on a trade and investment barrier investigation into the EU’s FSR” January, 9. https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/january-2025/the-chinese-ministry-of-commerce-issues-a-final-determination-on-a-trade-and. Accessed: April 22, 2026.
14.
See Shandong Coal Machinery Industry Association, “详细解读’专精特新’最新认定标准和流程 [A Detailed Interpretation of the Latest Identification Standards and Processes of ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel (SSCN)’],“ March 2, 2023, http://www.sdmjw.org.cn/HYPY/03021506.html; People’s Daily, “财政部：进一步加大对国家级专精特新’小巨人’企业支持力度 [Ministry of Finance: Further Increase Support for National-Level Specialized and New ‘Little Giant’ Enterprises],“ February 18, 2022, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1725093696186722910&wfr=spider&for=pc; Jiangsu Association for Science and Technology, “31省市’专精特新’政策汇总（一） [Summary of 31 Provinces and Cities’ ‘Specialized, Streamlined, Characteristic, and Novel’ Policies (1)],“ October 25, 2022, http://www.jscxxh.org.cn/detail.html?id=1124.
15.
See European Union Chamber of Commerce, Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda (2016); Chen Linxi et al., “China’s Capacity Reduction Reform and Its Impact on Producer Prices,“ IMF Working Papers 2018, no. 216, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484375914.001.
16.
During the 2016-2018 overcapacity campaign, M&As were a core restructuring tool. In steel, M&As were incentivized through credit support and dedicated fiscal funds, while in aluminum it was embedded in a binding capacity-replacement mechanism. In the current framework, M&A is no longer binding: In steel, incentives are limited to more favorable capacity-replacement ratios, while in aluminum it is only encouraged. Recent measures have expanded financing channels for M&A but remain non-sector specific and do not introduce binding enforcement mechanisms.
17.
OilChem, https://en.oilchem.net/.
18.
Barry Naughton, The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020 (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios China-México (CECHIMEX), Facultad de Economía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021).
19.
Early examples of scenario based development include Ministry of Science and Technology et al., “关于加快场景创新以人工智能高水平应用促进经济高质量发展的指导意见 [Guiding Opinions on Accelerating Scenario Innovation to Promote High-Quality Economic Development Through High-Level Application of Artificial Intelligence],“ July 29, 2022 (published August 12, 2022), https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/gfxwj/gfxwj2022/202208/t20220812_181851.html.
20.
Rhodium Group analysis of Peking University, PKU Law (ChinaLawInfo) database, https://www.pkulaw.com/.
21.
See Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #275: What Does China’s Government Procurement Market Tell Us about Large Model Diffusion?,“ ChinAI Newsletter, July 29, 2024, https://chinai.substack.com/p/chinai-275-what-does-chinas-government; Tech Buzz China Insider, “The State of Chinese AI Apps 2025,“ October 27, 2025, https://techbuzzchina.substack.com/p/the-state-of-chinese-ai-apps-2025.
22.
China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, “China Artificial Intelligence Industry Development Report (2025) [人工智能产业发展研究报告（2025年）],“ January 2026, http://caict.ac.cn/kxyj/qwfb/bps/202602/t20260202_712679.htm.
23.
Ibid.
24.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Two Loops: How China’s Open AI Strategy Reinforces its industrial Dominance (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2026).
25.
Brian Deese et al., “Global Clean Investment Monitor: Government Support for Electric Vehicles and Batteries,“ Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, July 2025, https://ceepr.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/MIT-CEEPR-RC-2025-02.pdf.
26.
See Yifan Wei, Yuen Yuen Ang, and Nan Jia, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Government Guidance Funds in China,“ The China Quarterly 256 (2023): 939–959, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741023000280; Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
27.
Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, “Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds,“ Center for Security and Emerging Technology, March 2021, https://doi.org/10.51593/20200098.
28.
Tracked by the National Bureau of Statistics for companies above a certain threshold.
29.
Tiago Devesa, et al., “Geopolitics and geometry of global trade: 2026 update: Tariff splashes, AI waves, and the ripples reshaping global trade,“ McKinsey Global Institute, March 2026.
30.
European Chamber of Commerce, “Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform Agenda,“ 2016.
31.
According to ADB MRIO input-output tables at constant 2010 prices.
32.
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, Exporting Control: China’s New Strategic Toolkit (Beijing: European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2026).
33.
“Xi Jinping Presided over the Second Meeting of the Central Committee for the Comprehensive Rule of Law and Delivered an Important Speech,” Xinhua, February 25, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-02/25/content_5368422.htm
34.
“Make Good Use of Legal Weapons to Safeguard National Interests: Strengthen the Construction of Foreign-Related Rule of Law System,” People’s Daily, January 11, 2021, www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202101/2e4dafe2a53342609191ab522b88dfc2.shtml.
35.
Chang An Jian, “Chen Yixin Published a Signed Article in the People’s Daily: Studying and Implementing Xi Jinping’s Rule of Law Needs to Grasp the Ten Major Relationships,” Legal Daily, December 7, 2021, www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2021-12/07/content_8639612.htm.
36.
Figures sourced from listed firm financial disclosures on Bloomberg.
37.
According to Rhodium Group’s China Outbound Intelligence data
38.
Jennie Bai, et al., “The Ripple Effects of China’s Global Ownership,” The American Finance Association, April 2024.