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Report
In this first edition of the new Global Clean Investment Monitor, we explore how—after decades of national policy support, primarily in the US, China, and Europe—electric vehicles and batteries have been catapulted into mass commercialization.
Report
Chinese FDI in the EU and UK reached €10 billion in 2024, rising 47% from the previous year. Europe also captured 53.2% of Chinese investment in high-income economies.
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In the first quarter of 2025, clean energy and transportation investment in the United States totaled $67.3 billion, a 6.9% increase from the same period in 2024 but a 3.8% decrease from the previous quarter.
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To answer whether MIC25 was successful, we measure outcomes across four of the plan's main categories: China’s import dependency, dependency on foreign companies, global competitiveness, and technological leadership.
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Compared to other countries, China’s approach to industrial policy has been characterized by broader and more entrenched market distortions, deeply systemic rather than targeted, and with a far greater distortive effect on global trade.
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In the final quarter of 2024, clean energy and transportation investment in the United States totaled $70 billion, reflecting a slight 1% decline from the previous quarter but a 6% increase from the same period in 2023.
Report
We review China’s role in four major sectors—apparel, consumer electronics, PV, and autos—over the past decade, then consider four plausible scenarios to 2030 and their implications for China’s future role in global trade and investment patterns.
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The emerging industry of CDR encompasses an array of innovative solutions that are ready for takeoff. On top of climate change mitigation, industrial scaling will have widely distributed economic, social, and environmental benefits.
Report
Clean energy and transportation investment in the United States continued its record-setting growth in Q3 of 2024, reaching a new high of $71 billion.
Report
We examine three G20 case countries—Brazil, South Korea, and Indonesia—and their likely responses to both US and Chinese economic statecraft in an escalation of tensions over Taiwan.